*) Manuswp.wpd

                                   

WORLD PEACE - Dunia Damai - RLA *)

 

Our messages “Risalah” - “Theory of HDA “ together with the “Formulae”  Mathematical Models in predicting human behaviors - would competent in producing , making the benefit of civilization, a good life, available for the whole human race,; such as of making ‘welfare for all’ , world peace, RLA - Rahmatan Lil `Alamiin a practical objectives instead of a mere utopian dream. Where the new social has surely come to stay with us as long , at any rate , as our new invention of applying mechanical power to technology  - a transformation, ... a turning point  - .... so the opinion so the actions ...... - so the law of ‘Life and to Live ‘ so the good life .

 

Those three of our master piece manuscripts above together with the CD packets  -- constructed in three decades , having the ability to define the absolute / GOD, Good versus Bad & morality ; Ending Epoch where sciences and  knowledge are complete except at the marginal, a creation during infinitesimal of time _ Kun fa yakuun - coverage TOE and HDA theory then emerging the standard measure theoretically so that we can do in justice for those quantum abstract objects could be seen in the monitor, or,  Lopian of HDA  -  these means that  we are at a very exciting moment in history , perhaps a turning point .. ; as said by al-hadith, that at the end, ending epoch, umat Islam would be divided into 73 parts and those 72 parts are in hell except the only one part; Capra’s that mankind as a whole is in a state of ‘perception crises’ ; Toynbee’s humanity , only withdraw, searching of worldliness is the only human activity recorded in history, while return aren’t recorded at all, those only the prophet and the real leader done it; Sura Qosos-verse 77 Fond of worldliness versus Fond of the hereafter = Toynbee’s withdraw & return; According to the Lopian of HDA those withdraw only attains 2-3 % progress , those return getting the standard measure of standard progress = 3x10^18 joules.; Lecomte du Nouy’s humanity has not reach the age of reason and its effort still on the scale of the tribe ... humankind is now experiencing an evolutionary  shock front ➟ Prigogine’s boundary condition to transform into high level of good life,  and may emerge very quickly into coordinated forms such as it has never known before ... When the puzzles and paradoxes cry out for resolution a paradigm is due - fortunately during these twentieth century humanity had completely having the equipments in solving this new ideal  welfare for all , e.g., classical - quantum sciences that become too technical and mathematical producing HDA/ TOE , high-tech, and internet that’s why we that born in the X Xth century having the task to fulfil this new ideal - working together in “World Islah Enterprise” split  into   4 compartment RI/ Rational Intelligence, EI/ Emotional Intelligence, PI / Psychomotoric Intelligence and SI / Spiritual Intelligence ; ...  that the step by step implementations of welfare for all can be arranged completely in accordance with HDA’s islah (= upgrade resulting in peaceful) & the  ISO or P3JJ alignment then the result would be simple and easily comprehendsible to every one –  are combat ready to be launched !

 

Probably to comprehend the ideal of a good Life an to Live , Welfare for All, World Peace as a whole we could scrutinize of the many predictions of those and they are countless others that would have served equally well to illustrate our point ; As long as we ‘ve done probably those two Toynbee’s and Lecomte du Nouy’s  enclosed underneath are sufficiently well

 

  

Arnold J. Toynbee, “Not the age of Atom but of Welfare for All” or “The Welfare State, Comunism & World Peace”.

 

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE

 

The Welfare State, Communism and World Peace^*

 

In the contemporary world - in whatever age or century one happens to be living - religion and political differences between various sections of the living generation are apt to seem absolute and ultimate. For instance, our seventeenth century ancestors in Western Christendom could not conceive of any greater gulf than that which seemed in their day to be fixed between the Catholic and Protestant varieties of Western Christianity. By contrast, we their descendants, looking back on them and their conflicts in the perspective of three centuries of history, are far more conscious of the gulf between our own age and the world of the seventeenth century then we are of the domestic divisions within that seventeenth century world. To our eyes, those Protestants and Catholics are all alike, seventeenth-century-minded people first and foremost; and it needs some effort of discrimination on our part to appreciate the nice distinction between the warring religious camps.

 

In the light of this historical precedent - and there are countless others that would have served equally well to illustrate our point - we may be sure that, 300 years from today, our own descendants will be much more alive to the common features of the twentieth century world - and especially those common features  that seem to them distinctive - than they will be to the current differences that mean so much at the moment to all members of the living generation, in whatever continent or camp we may happen to have been born.

 

Can we guess what the outstanding feature of our twentieth century will appear to be in the perspective of 300 years? No doubt we shall not all guess alike. Some of us will guess that the present age will be looked back upon as the age of scientific discovery. Others will expect to see it branded as the age in which Fascist and Communist apostates from a Christian civilization harnessed science to the service of a neo-barbarism. My own guess is that our age will be remembered chiefly neither for its horrifying crimes nor for its astonishing inventions, but for its having been the first age since the dawn of civilization, some five or six thousand year back, in which people dared to think it practicable to make the benefits of civilization available for the whole human race.

 

By comparison with the significance of this common twentieth century new ideal, the differences between the conflicting ideologies will - so I should guess - come to look both less important and less interesting than will be easily credible to anyone alive today. In the easy wisdom that comes after the event,”our successors” will, perhaps, be able to pronounce that this or that policy for achieving a common twentieth century ideal was more suitable than the rival policy was to the social conditions of this or that region in that antique and still unstandardized twentieth century world.

 

They may even judge that one twentieth century ideology was better or worse than another in some absolute moral sense. But the common features of our century will, I fancy, be the features standing out the most prominently in perspective; and, among these, the new ideal and objective of extending the benefits of civilization to the common man will in future centuries tower above the rest.

 

Perhaps there are two points here that are worth underlining: This vision of a good life for all is a new one, and - whatever our success or our failure may be in the attempt to translate this vision into reality - this new social objective has probably come to stay. That the ideal of welfare for all is new is surely true; for, as far as I can see, it is no older than seventeenth century West European settlements on the east coast of North America that have grown into the United States. And it has surely come to stay with us as long, at any rate, as our new invention to applying mechanical power to technology; for this sudden vast enhancement of man’s ability to make non human nature produce what man requires from her has, for the first time in history, made the ideal of welfare for all a practical objective instead of a merely utopian dream.

 

So long as this aim continues to be practical politics, mankind is certain, however many times we may fail, to go on making on attempt after another to reach the goal. When once the odious inequality that has hitherto been a distinguishing mark of civilization has ceased to be taken for granted as something inevitable, it becomes inhuman to go on putting up with it - and still more inhuman to try to perpetuate this inequality deliberately.

 

Of course it was one particular ingredient in welfare - a spiritual ingredient which was at the heart of it - that was the objective of the first settlers from the Old World on this American coast. They were inspired to pull up their roots in the Old World and to set about the creation of a new world beyond the Atlantic by the hope of being able at this cost to purchase liberty - religious liberty above all, since they were living in the seventeenth century. But, as soon as they realized that their quest for liberty had landed them on the edge of a vast fallow but cultivable continent, the vision began to dawn upon their minds and hearts of offering the opportunity of a good life for everybody - by offering everybody the opportunity of carving a farm for himself out of a seemingly illimitable expanse of potentially arable land.

 

The ideal of welfare for all came into the world initially in North American in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries because the sudden acquisition of immense new virgin material resources here for the first time made this vision seem practical.

 

It is noteworthy that the North American society which first conceived of this ideal was still living in the Old World, though it had established it self on the American side of the Atlantic. It was still living in the Old World in the sense that it remained in a pre-industrial age in which the natural resources that were the material bases of civilization were the crops and cattle on which the earliest civilizations had been reared.

 

The Original North American version of this new ideal was still an ideal of welfare for everybody in an old-fashioned agricultural society. In the civilizations of the past there had been a just sufficient stock of arable land to provide a bare subsistence for all and a good life, in addition to a subsistence, for a very small minority. It was manifest to everyone that the normal resources of an agricultural society could not maintain more than a small minority of the whole population at a level higher than that of bare subsistence.

 

The chance of welfare for everybody in the North American agricultural society, which came after the plow first broke the continent’s virgin soil, was no more than a limited and transitory one. Vast thought the untouched reserves of arable land in North America might seem in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries by comparison with agricultural opportunities in an agriculturally long since congested Western Europe, the North American continent was only a small fraction of the whole habitable world, and it took little more than 100 year to bring North America’s fields under cultivation.

 

If the new material resources required in order the make practical politics of the new ideal of welfare for all had been confined forever to new agricultural resources, the dream would soon have faded away again. After the conquest of North America by the plow, the only remaining virgin soil in the Temperate Zone was Manchuria; and after the plow’s conquest of Manchuria in the early twentieth century, the future of mankind, as a whole, so far from being anything like “welfare for all”, would have been something like the present as it can be seen in China or India.

 

The reason why “welfare for all”is still practical politics in the world at large today is because we have tapped a wholly new kind of material resource in discovering how to harness mechanical power to technology. Mankind’s hope of better things lies in a permanent industrial revolution.

 

As a twentieth century non-American sees it, looking back on nineteenth century American history, the American outlook, like all particular outlooks, is based on a particular experience; and the particular experience that has molded current American ideals to their present shape is that experience of stumbling upon a whole continent of virgin arable soil. The ground for the American hope of providing a good life for ail was expressed in the two nineteenth century American magic words, “Go West.”

 

In a nineteenth century agricultural United States, the local and temporary existence of empty arable lands did indeed give to the weaker party in the economic arena so effective a bargaining power in his dealings with the stronger party that it was possible for the weaker party to win his fair share of welfare without its being necessary to curb the stronger party’s freedom of economic action. Even under the very different American conditions of today, enough of these nineteenth century agrarian American circumstances perhaps still survive in a twentieth century industrial America for the best of both worlds to be still more or less practical politics locally in the United States.

 

By “the best of both world” I mean, of course, a maximum of opportunity for all, combined with a minimum of restriction upon a stronger and wealthier minority’s freedom of action. But if this state of relative felicity is perhaps still attainable locally in the United States, it certainly is not, any more than it ever has been, practical politics in the world at large.

The outlook of the twentieth century world at large is governed, as I see it, by two fact. The first fact is that three-quarters of mankind are today still living the traditional life of an agricultural civilization in which there is no reserve of virgin soil and therefore no possibility of providing more than a tiny minority of the population with anything better than bare subsistence out of agricultural production.

 

But, in this old-fashioned starveling agrarian world, the Industrial Revolution has brought with it a hope for all mankind, from the prosperous American technician and farmer to the most miserable Chinese or Indian coolie, of breaking right through the iron limits to which the extension of the benefits of civilization has normally been subject in an agricultural society.

 

This hope is now rapidly dawning in the hearts of the depressed and ignorant peasantry that today still constitutes three-quarters of the living generation of mankind. They have begun to ask themselves how they are to attain those benefits of civilization which a mechanized technology has at last brought within the horizon of every man’s hopes. But, considering the greatness of the gulf between present Asian and present American circumstances, it seems unlikely that the common Asian and American objective of extending the benefits of civilization to every man by drawing on the new resources of a mechanical technology can be attained in Asia in exactly the American way.

 

A common goal has to be approached along different roads by people who start their journey toward it from different quarters of the social compass. We must therefore expect to see an ideal which Americans have brought into the world being pursued by Asians and Africans on lines which, in contemporary American eves, may, at best, look strange and, at worst, look misguided.

 

How is this depressed three-quarters of mankind going to set about the stupendously difficult task of gaining the benefits of civilization? Now that the hundreds of millions of peasants are aware of the relative well-being of the Western peoples, nothing is going to stop them from setting out to reach a goal which the West seems to them to have attained already. And no doubt only trial and error are going to make them aware of the difficulties in their path which are glaringly manifest to western eyes.

 

For us Westerners it is easy to see that the mass of mankind today does not command those assets and advantages which have enabled a Western minority within the last two centuries to make some progress toward a wider distribution of the benefits of civilization inside the narrow circle of our Western society. Unlike nineteenth century and twentieth century America, the have no great installations of industrial plant, no human fund of widespread technical skill, no professionally competent and experienced middle class and - most serious deficiency of all - none of those Western traditions and habits of personal conduct which are the ultimate source of all the West’s material success. If the mass of mankind did appreciate the seriousness of that handicaps, the might indeed be discouraged, but we can already see that this practical side of the problem is not going to be uppermost in non-Western minds.

 

Asia and Africa are going to make an audacious attempt to catch up with the West by a forced march, and here lies communism’s opportunity in a world in which the Russian ideology of communism is competing with the Western ideal of free enterprise for Asia’s and Africa’s allegiance.

 

The present state of mind of an awakening majority of the human race in Asia and Africa is communism’s opportunity because a forced march can never be made without severe regimentation and discipline. The rules of the Soviet Union can plausibly represent to the rest of the non-Western world that their own system of totalitarian government already enables the peoples of the Soviet Union to overcome just those practical obstacles by which other non-Western peoples are faced.

 

This Russian claim is bound to appeal to Asians and Africans who are eager to reach the goal of welfare for all and who are also in a mood in which they will give priority to equality over liberty in a situation in which they may have choose between the two. And this inclination in Asia and African minds to see salvation in communism is bound to be riling for Western observers.

 

What, then, is our Western policy to be? Being human, we might be tempted to give way to our sense of annoyance. Why not wash our hands of this whole Asian and African business? Isn’t this dream of welfare for all mankind just a folly? And, if they are hoping for salvation in communism, cannot we count on their being disillusioned sooner or later? Such a reaction on our part would be as natural as it would be rash and wrong.

 

It would be rash because we could not be sure that the Soviet Union might not secure a political and military hold over Asia and Africa before the process of disillusionment had time to work itself out. And it would also be wrong for us to hold aloof because we human beings are, after all, our brother’s keepers, and we cannot be indifferent to the fate of three-quarters of the human race.

 

In this difficult situation the supreme need of the hour is, I would suggest, an immense patience and mutual toleration. A revolutionary improvement in means of communication has suddenly brought peoples with sharply diverse traditions or civilizations into close physical contact with one another. If, in spite of our diversity, we find ourselves all alike pursuing what is ultimately a common ideal, this is something to be thankful for. If we believe in the freedom which the Pilgrim Fathers came to look for on American shores, we must believe in the right of each people to work its way toward our common objective along a freely chosen course of its own.

 

Acting on this belief means acting toward Asian and African countries as we are already acting toward Yugoslavia. We must be ready to work with any non-Western country which agrees with the West on the crucial political point of being determined to resist Russian attempts to dominate the world, and we must not lav it down as a condition for their receiving help from us that the people who are asking us for assistance shall pursue our common social aim of welfare for all along Western lines.

 

We should be ready to help countries living under near-Communist and outright Communist regimes; for we should realize that some such dispensation as this may be the inevitable price of the forced march that these countries have to make if they are to try catch up with us. And we should also have faith enough in our own way of life to believe that, if we do give a helping hand to peoples who have been compelled by a temporary necessity to put themselves under non-Russian totalitarian regimes, that they will take to our Western liberty just as soon as they find themselves able to afford it.

 

 

^* The New York Times Magazine ( October 23, 1953).

 

 

THE CONCEPT OF THE SECOND COMING IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL SETTING^*

 

The flash of intuition in which the concept of the Second Coming was first conceived must evidently have been a response to the particular challenge of the time and the place; and the critic who has not yet extricated himself from the modern error of supposing that things have nothing more in them than is to be found in their origins may make the mistake of depreciating the Christian doctrine of the Second Coming on the ground that it originated in a disappointment: the disappointment of the Primitive Christian community in the first generation when they realized that their Master had actually come and gone once without the looked-for effect. Here was a prophet in Israel who had boldly broken away from the Jewish Messianic tradition by adopting the unfamiliar and paradoxical principle of non-violence. He had been faithful to His principle, and the principle itself had apparently been confuted by the outcome; for He had allowed Himself to be put to death; and, as far as could be seen, His death had left His followers without prospects. If they were to find the heart to carry on their Master’s mission, they must draw the sting of failure from their Master’s career by projecting this career from the past into the future. If they were to preach Christ crucified - which was ‘unto the Jews a stumblingblock and unto the Greeks foolishness’¹ - they must believe and proclaim that the career which had ended in the Crucifixion was only the First Coming of their Master, and that He was to come again in power and glory in order to prove that ‘God hath chosen the foolish thing of the World to confound the wise and God hath chosen the weak things of the World to confound the thing which mighty’.²

                                               

It is certainly true that the doctrine of the Second Coming was conceived in the Primitive Christian Church at a time when the Church was oppressed by a sense of weakness and failure, and when even its keenest minds had as yet no inkling of the tremendous victories which Christianity was to win in the fullness of time on the Strength of the First Coming alone. It is also true that this doctrine of the Second Coming has since been adopted with the greatest enthusiasm by societies and sects and peoples that have been in this same disappointed or frustrated state of mind.

 

In the myth of the Second Coming of Arthur, for example, the vanquished Britons have consoled themselves for the splendid failure of the historic Arthur to avert the ultimate victory of the English barbarian invaders.^I In the myth of the Second Coming of Barbarossa, again, the Germans of the later Middle Ages have consoled themselves for their failure to maintain the hegemony over Western Christendom which their forefathers had held from the Volkerwanderung down to the age of the Hohenstaufen.

 

“To the south-west of the the green plain that girdles in the rock of Salzburg, the gigantic mass of the Untersberg frowns over the road which winds up a long defile to the glen and lake of Berchtesgaden. There, far up among its limestone crags, in a spot scarcely accessible to human foot, the peasants of the valley point out to the traveller the black mouth of a cavern, and tell him that within Barbarossa lies amid his knights in an enchanted sleep, waiting the hour when the ravens shall cease to hover round the peak, and the pear-tree [shall] blossom in the valley, to descend with his Crusaders and bring back to Germany the golden age of peace and strength and unity. Often in the evil days that followed the fall of Frederick’s house, often when tyranny seemed unendurable and anarchy endless, men thought on that cavern and sighed for the day when the long sleep of the just Emperor should be broken and his shield be hung aloft again as of old in the camp’s midst - a sign of help to the poor and the oppressed.”³

 

Barbarossa and his knights in their cave are re-sleeping the sleep of the Seven Sleepers of Ephesus, whose awaking is a sign that the persecution of the Christian Chruch by the Roman Empire is overpast.

 

The most striking of all the derivative versions of the Second Coming is that which reflects the disappointment of the Shi’ah.

 

“The Shi’ite Movement began in the first century of Islam as political propaganda against the Umayyad dynasty of Caliphs in favour of the house of ‘Ali, the son-in-law and cousin of the Prophet. It was then hand in glove with the orthodox, and succeeded both in impressing its historical point of view on orthodox sentiment and in overthrowing the hated dynasty, only to be cheated of its political hopes by the establishment of the rival ‘Abbasid line, and to fall instead under a more methodical persecution than hirherto. Shi’ism not took to the catacombs, and soon became a separate heretical sect, distinguished by the doctrine of allegiance to a devinely appointed, sinless, and infallible spiritual leader, the Imam, instead of an elective lay head or Caliph. The Imamate they held to be hereditary in the house of ‘Ali, but the various sub-groups differed on the point at which the succession of Imam was interrupted. The belief of the principal group, or “Twelvers”, to which the Shi’ites of Persia and ‘Iraq still belong, was that twelfth Imam of the line disappeared about the year 873 [of the Christian Era] into a cave at Hillah, but that the continues, through the heads of the religious organisation, to provide spiritual and temporal guidance for his people, and will reappear as the promised Mahdi to bring the long reign of tyranny to an end. This strange doctrine of a “Hidden Imam” or “Expected Imam”, often referred to as “the Master of the Age”, is recalled by the ceremony at Hillah of which Ibn Battutah gives a graphic description.”⁴